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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic issues of the present world (such as poverty, inequality, 
backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many current discussions. The achievements 
of the modern age, and in particular of the post- World War II period, are considered in the perspective of 
economic and demographic history, and in their relations with the contemporary systems of production 
and of international relations.  
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1. Introduction 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress 
is perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in 
some quarters (radical economists and political scientists in particular) of the economic 
institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of “capitalism” and 
“globalization”).1 However, from the perspective of economic history, the present state 
of the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact is that never in the 
history of mankind have there been so many paupers as in the present times. But the 
                                                 
1 For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007). For a confutation of all sort of widespread 
anti-globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2004. For a forceful defence of 
capitalist globalization see Norberg (2003). 
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reason for this is that there have never been so many people around. Indeed never in the 
history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor people been so low. 
Moreover, quite recently even the absolute number of world paupers has kept 
decreasing. Economic inequality in the world as a whole has probably never been so 
high, but the reason is not, as sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer has worsened 
(“exploitation”), but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic improvement 
of the many. At the same time the propensity towards economic inequality (as captured 
by the extraction ratio, defined below) has probably never been so low. The agricultural 
revolution and technological progress have contributed to decisively overcome the 
Malthusian trap and bring about an impressive demographic explosion. Indeed, never in 
the history of the world has economic and demographic growth been so rapid as after 
WWII, greatly favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of the sort that were endemic in 
the past, and by the extraordinary expansion of international exchanges. Global overall 
peace can be obviously attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, but also to 
a change of perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of 
aggression and conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game, that was already 
attempted, but utterly failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been the 
lingering of the world on the brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing 
of frontiers and national aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the 
end of the Cold War). But Malthusian traps, and different forces leading to 
destabilization of relatively peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion 
of nuclear capabilities and the raise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with 
the possibility of drawing the post-war period of overall peaceful economic and 
demographic growth eventually to a close. 
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting 
to near stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per 
capita incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and 
whenever they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the 
long run, to some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial 
revolution things have started radically to change. But never have world population and 
world income increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the 
explosion both in wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical 
unicum. Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind, the 
anomaly to be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. 
The brakes that in the previous epochs constrained the growth of world population, and 
which started to slacken following the Industrial Revolution,3 have apparently been 
swept away by the progressive lengthening in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented 
demographic growth, which has been accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
                                                 
2 This means all-out wars between major military powers. 
3 Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has 
led first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene 
innovations it was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth 
century and later, coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed  the Second Industrial Revolution 
(cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
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Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there 
has never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post 
WWII period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the 
World Bank, as (absolute)4 poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,5 in 2001 
their number was estimated as 2.7 billion,6 more than the entire world population in 
1950.7 The number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2001 is 
reckoned to have been close to 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population 
in 1820 (which may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the 
Industrial Revolution in the UK and of its spreading outside); the number of the 
extreme poor in previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.6 billion 
around 1980 (before the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of 
them are concentrated in third world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a 
number of them leaving from) Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition 
countries).8 See the data in the following tables:9 
                                                 
4 Relative poverty depends on distribution. Then there is subjective poverty that depends on habits and 
aspirations, where the latter increase with the diffusion, facilitated by the means of mass communication, 
of the consumption models of the better off. We shall be concerned only cursory with these issues. 
5 Or rather 2.15 dollars a day at 1993 purchasing power (somewhat less than 800 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 2 dollars of 1985 international purchasing power. According to the World Bank 
definition 1.08 dollars of 1993 purchasing power a day (somewhat less than 400 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 1 dollar at 1985 international purchasing power, characterize extreme poverty. In the 
text we use the colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. (For the definition of the 
international poverty line see World Bank, 2005, table 2.5, “Poverty”, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm#definition; see also UNPD, 2007,  p. 367). 
6 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. It should be noted that there has been actually a 
decrease (estimated at about 400 million) in the number of the extreme poor (less than 1$ a day) during 
the 20 years from 1981 to 2001, but only because of the reduction of extreme poverty in China, and 
some further decrease in the amount of the less extreme poor seems to be happening in the more recent 
years. For some recent discussion on world poverty estimates and some updating, see Chen and 
Ravaillon (2004) and (2007) and Ravaillon, Chen and Sangraula (2007). Taking into account the overall 
number of the world poor, one can appreciate the enormous migratory potential towards the more 
prosperous (or even the less poor) countries in a shrinking world, with potential far-reaching social and 
political consequences (for more on this point see Chilosi, 2002). Countries of emigration can at the 
same time become countries of immigration from even poorer countries, such as notably in the case of 
Eastern Europe as a whole, or parts of North Africa. (On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 
2007.) 
7 See Table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means 
uncontroversial, source. The accuracy of World Bank data is challenged in particular by Dhalla (2002) 
who estimates a significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in poverty in 
the two decades of accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
8 The above data refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the area are essentially concentrated in 
the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern Europe) and of the former Soviet 
Union. 
9 The figures are expressed in  millions, the data are extracted from  World Bank, 2005, table 2.5. 
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Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day10 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 1,170 864 
of which China 876 594 
Europe & Central Asia 20 93 (113 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean  99 128 
Middle East & North Africa 52 70 
South Asia 821 1,064 
Sub-Saharan Africa 288 516 
Total 2450 2735 
Excluding China 1,574 2,142 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than  1$ a day11 
Region 1981 2001 
East Asia & Pacific 796 271 
 China 634 212 
Europe & Central Asia 3 17(30 in 
1999) 
Latin America & Caribbean 36 50 
Middle East & North Africa 9 7 
South Asia 475 431 
Sub-Saharan Africa 164 313 
Total 1,482 1,089 
Excluding China 848 877 
 
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has 
reached a peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition 
process during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to 
the percentage of the poor in the population, increasing, according to World Bank data, 
from 0.4 in 1987 to a peak of 6.3 in 1999, decreasing to 3.6 in 2001 (for those living with 
less than 1$ a day); increasing from 3.3 in 1987 to a peak of 23.8 in 1999, decreasing to 
19.7 in 2001 (for those living with less than 2$ a day).12 
                                                 
10 Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm.  
11 Source: ibidem. 
12 Source of the data in the following table: ibidem. 
 - 5 -
Table 3. Percentage of the poor in Eastern Europe (in 2002) 
 Below1$ 
a day 
Below 
2$ a day 
Albania <2 11.8 
Belarus <2 <2 
Bosnia nd nd 
Bulgaria 4.7 16.2 
Croatia <2 <2 
Cz. Rep. <2 <2 
Estonia <2 5.2 
Hungary <2 <2 
Latvia <2 8.3 
Lithuania <2 6.9 
Macedonia <2 4 
Moldova 22 63.7 
Poland <2 <2 
Romania <2 14 
Russia <2 7.5 
Ser. Mon. nd nd 
Slovenia <2 <2 
Slovakia <2 2.9 
Ukraine 2.9 45.7 
 
3. The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been 
so low.13 
According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, pp. 731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 
2001, estimated by the World Bank, as well as the estimate of the size of world 
population in 2001, reported in table 4, the share of world population living in poverty 
diminishes from 94,4% in 1820 to 44% in 2001, that of those living in extreme poverty 
from 83,9 in 1820 down to 18% in 2001. In the end, taking into account the fact that in 
the period the share of the poor has been greatly reduced, the fundamental explanation 
of why there are so many poor people in the world is that there are so many people 
around. Indeed, human population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two 
centuries, and in particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in 
table 4. 
                                                 
13 Of course this depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use the World Bank definition, 
whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing power. This may not well correspond to a 
subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the sense of deprivation 
(see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). Subjective deprivation may be a function of achieved 
living standards, and increasing expectations (cf. Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144). All this is perfectly true, 
but without a common measure one could hardly make intertemporal comparisons. Of course, in 
making the latter one should ideally go into detail as to the specific relevant circumstances of the various 
cases (possibly extending the narrative to the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content 
to note that the trends in average incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in life statistics (see 
below). 
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Table 414 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 15 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2008 6,641, the 1/1/2008, as projected according to the World population clock 
To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent 
times one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 
2005 (796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the 
start of the agricultural revolution to the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we 
may conventionally the take year 1750). 
                                                 
14 The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 
1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau (2007a); 1-1700 
and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-2005, United 
Nations, 2006, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b. The data from 1800 in 
Europe and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a fair degree of 
reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less wild guesses. 
They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data with any 
degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more to the 
estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow.  
15 Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms 
with the fact that the momentous historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in 
history books, involved such comparatively insignificant numbers of people.  
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If we concentrate our attention to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
in the periodization of table 6 below, we can see that the highest rate of population 
growth in history has taken place in the years 1950-73, slightly less but still remarkable 
was the rate of growth of population in 1870-1913, while the low rates in the period 
1914-1950 were certainly due to the impact of two world wars and of their aftermath. 
The negative rate of growth in the latest period can be fairly attributed to the social and 
economic disruptions following the fall of the communist regimes. 
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of the world population still lives in poverty, world 
income and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU 
economic research centre on poverty and development16 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the 
extent of world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 17  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) 
with only 15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at 
PPP$). The 64 poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world 
personal wealth (8% at PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)18 
In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  
PPP$ terms)19; the richest 10%, 85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).20 
The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth distribution (calculated using 
current exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in PPP$ terms)21, the same as that of a group 
of 10, where 1 has 1000, and 9, 1 each.22 
Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal 
way. According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini 
                                                 
16 World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
17 Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et 
alii, 2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on 
household balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 
80% of wealth) extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries 
wealth concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class 
averages imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data considered refer to the year 
2000, and are either measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars (PPP$; this means that all values are converted in dollars using exchange rates, such that the 
purchasing power of the dollar will be more or less the same once transformed in the various world 
currencies). It must be noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world 
inequality, since the dollar purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter 
substantially the global picture. It should be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is 
based on limited data and fraught with methodological difficulties; therefore one should stress that, as is 
always the case with statistics, but much more in the present instance, the data should be considered to 
give some order of magnitude rather than to be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the 
methods used in the inquiry one may refer to the above source. 
18 Ibidem, Table 8. 
19 “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
20 Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
21 Ibidem, Table 12.. 
22 Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
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coefficient of world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.23 To 
make a comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is 
reported as 36, that of the USA 45, that of Sweden 25. 24 The state where the Gini index 
appears to be highest, among those reported in CIA’s World Factbook, is Namibia with 
71, but probably only because in other, even more unequal, third world countries no 
statistical data allowing its calculation are available. 25 
Table 5. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history26 
year Gini coefficient of world income distribution
Percentage of the population living in 
Poverty 
Percentage of the population living in extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 
(0.699)27 
44 18 
                                                 
23 The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological 
approaches used to get those values. From the historical viewpoint it is believed that in the past  income 
differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than nowadays in the determination of global 
inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than half of global income inequality could have been due to 
inequality in income distribution inside nations, while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is 
deemed to be due to differences in average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9) 
On the other hand in more recent times, in the eighties and nineties, the weight of the inside nations 
component seems to have somewhat increased: (cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697.) The greater growth rate of less 
developed countries as a whole should be a factor leading to the reduction of the between nations 
component, while increased inequality inside developed countries would be a factor contributing to the 
increased inside inequality component. According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002, p. 731) there has been an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, from 0,50 in 1820 
up to the present values (see table 5). But values for so far away periods seem to be rather speculative 
estimates, even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive at an aggregate measure for 
the contemporary world as a whole. On the other hand it seems plausible that the differences in incomes 
should have been lower in the past, owing to the fact that the great bulk of the population was living 
close to subsistence level, and the low overall average per capita incomes. 
24 The Gini coefficients above are taken from CIA (2007). 
25 Such as Equatorial Guinea that, according to CIA (2007), has the “fourth highest per capita income in 
the world” but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions with less 
than a dollar a day (cf. also “Playboy waits for his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
26 Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the data of the last row are calculated from 
population data in table 4 and Word Bank poverty data. 
27 Calculation from 2002 Word Income Distribution Database in Milanovic (28/12/2007). The figure 
between brackets refer to a recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates (ibidem). 
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4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we do about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, and maximum potential inequality 
According to the previous table, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient, has steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of about 31% in Table 5), the 
proportion of paupers in the world has steadily decreased. In more recent times the 
inequality of income distribution inside nations seems on average to have somewhat 
increased, but the trend is not uniform in the different regions of the world.28 At the 
same time the changes in the world Gini coefficient of the present in relation to the 
more recent past are of a quite different order of magnitude as compared to the dramatic 
increase in per capita incomes. This signifies that the rate of surplus extraction (“the 
inequality extraction ratio”) has dramatically decreased, where the inequality extraction 
ratio is defined as the share of maximum potential inequality reached by actual inequality, 
given the relative size of the elite (where the actual size of the elite appears to have 
relatively minor practical importance in the determination of the Gini coefficient).29 In 
this perspective, the maximum of potential inequality depends on average income and 
subsistence income: if the incomes of the masses are maintained at physical subsistence 
level the surplus that is left corresponds to the rate of maximum potential extraction. 
The higher per capita income, the higher is the extent of maximum potential extraction. 
If the degree of statistical inequality is constant, an increase in average income translates 
into a lower rate of extraction, revealing a lower degree in the actual pursuit of inequality. 
This indeed is what has historically happened: the overall extraction rate has steadily 
decreased, a trend which could have been a consequence of the changed nature of 
political and economic institutions and of greater economic and social complexity.30 In 
the end, seen in an historical context, the extent of present inequality appears not to 
depend on the paupers of the world being worse off, since an increasing proportion of 
the worse off are lifted from their state of absolute poverty, but on the fact that on the 
whole the lot of humans has dramatically, albeit unequally, improved.31 To some extent 
inequality may be a consequence of the rules of economic organization (the economic 
system) that allow the attainment of the given level of production (as argued, with some 
exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is 
only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The 
latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself”). Thus it is 
conceivable that under real circumstances inequality could not be reduced below some 
level (such as operationally measured by Gini coefficient) without bringing about a 
reduction of income produced, and of its growth.32 At the same time too much 
                                                 
28 See IMF (2007a, pp. 138 f.). 
29 Cf. Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 10. 
30 See Milanovic et alii (2007). An instance of a recent reverse trend towards an increase in the rate of 
surplus extraction could have been the steep increase of chief executives compensations in some 
advanced economies, which may amount to a sort of surplus extraction engineered by collusive 
behaviour.  
31 As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … 
As societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which 
can be appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
32 “An artificially compressed distribution of income differs from the optimal distribution based on 
differences in talent, merit, and effort, and for this reason inhibits growth by affecting incentives, labour 
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inequality can have a negative impact on income and growth.33 One could then modify 
the concept of extraction rate as referring to the additional inequality above the 
minimum level compatible with the production of at least the given per capita income. 
(Operationally one could, for instance, take as an upper bound to the minimum amount 
of inequality compatible with the sustainable production of the given per capita income, 
the minimum inequality presented by comparable economies having similar levels of per 
capita income.) The above modification would strengthen the conclusion that overall the 
rate of surplus extraction is lower nowadays than in the past.34  
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of 
medical and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of growth 
of world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among the 
regions of the world the highest growth rate has been that of Africa, the poorest region 
with the least economic growth.35 From this it is immediately evident that the strongest 
factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical innovations rather 
than economic growth per se.36 The population explosion, together with the composite 
ethnic structure of the artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated 
in the post-colonial state boundaries,37 and the low educational attainments, contribute 
to explain the tensions and bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate 
continent.38 
                                                                                                                                           
shirking, and free-riding behaviour” (Cornia, 2004, p. 9), where the implied optimality presumably refers 
to fostering growth, and perhaps to some implied social welfare function. 
33 Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from 
history. On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme 
concentration of political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps 
through rent-seeking and rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.” For the 
relationship of inequality and growth, and the hypothesis that could be u-shaped (too little as well as too 
much inequality being adversary to growth) see Cornia et al. (2004). 
34 Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, another inequality of welfare. The latter is a very elusive 
concept, but it is what really matters. The first is at best a proxy. In considering how does income 
inequality translate into inequality in welfare it seems reasonable to assume decreasing utility of income, 
appraised for instance through “extended sympathy” (putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes). And 
this too could strengthen the conclusion that overall the rate of surplus extraction (this time in welfare 
terms) has become lower.  
35 The extreme poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is 41% (IMF October 2007b, p. 20). On the whole the 
post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some exceptions, notably 
Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s population-weighted per 
capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 2007a, p. 16763). But 
African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 2007a pp. 9, f.; IMF, 
2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth runs at about 3% a year, not a bad 
performance considering the very high population growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
36 A reductionist stance on the impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on 
demographic growth (before fertility controls step in) is taken by Easterly (1996, pp. 69-93). 
37 This does not mean that “natural” state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the patchwork 
distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. 
38 For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more 
amply, Collier 2007b. 
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4.2 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal 
distribution, and reducing poverty, without affecting the unique engine of growth and 
welfare that has been running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no 
much clarity of thought. As is often the case, what appears at first sight, is not what 
really is, if one looks rationally at the implications.  
4.2.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of 
the world market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired 
movements, would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic 
improvement of the enterprising poor. 39 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight 
of the poor more globalization is needed, not less.40 Globalization improves the welfare 
of the worse off essentially because it is conducive to greater growth41 that spills over to 
the very poor.42 However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the 
impact of technical progress, lead to an improvement of the worse off in relative terms43 
and inequality increases could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the 
increases in real incomes.44 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main 
culprit of recent increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to 
have been technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting 
                                                 
39 For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative 
position of the lower quintiles. 
40 For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progresses in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
41 On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see 
Dollar and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see 
Milanovic (2003).  
42 “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 
low income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of 
extreme poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). “Across all 
regions, the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a 
few post-crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of 
globalization … over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually 
all regions and all income groups during the recent period of globalization” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 
141). 
43 Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on 
this point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
44 Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, 
and even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, 
feelings of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the 
motivation for migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the 
resources for meeting the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of 
the poorest of the earth.  
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less skilled labour.45 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of 
increase of trade and financial flows,46 with the first having an overall equalizing, the 
second a disequalizing effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different 
areas of the world. According to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase 
inequality somewhat in developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of 
financial liberalization, while trade liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact 
anyway47) and decrease inequality in the less developed ones (because of the prevailing 
impact of trade liberalization).48 At the same time the diffusion of technological advances 
all over the world is obviously itself a manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly 
be isolated from the other intervening factors (such as for instance financial 
liberalization, since foreign direct investment in particular constitutes an essential vehicle 
for international technological transfers).  
4.2.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really 
bring about a significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth 
could be acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;49 in general, the 
propensity to aid the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the 
“development buzz … generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”50, but with 
somebody else’s money and resources. 51 As a prominent example we can mention the 
movement for international debt relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the 
only radical way to suppress debt is to suppress credit, while insolvency makes 
international debt more risky, and therefore more onerous, and this not necessarily is in 
the interest of poorer countries.52 None of the vocal members of the debt remission 
campaign seems to have started an international voluntary subscription for paying off 
poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing the creditors, or advocating that government 
                                                 
45 Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
46 This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries" (cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3). 
47 This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be 
explained by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in 
particular, and by the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (ibidem pp. 
155-156). As to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in 
underdeveloped countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the 
demand for skilled labor, whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for 
relatively lower-skilled workers in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
48 Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
49 The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
50 Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
51 As a prominent historical representative of the “somebody else’s money handouts” school we may 
mention Jeffrey Sachs. After all it is very easy for a practicing development economist to become 
popular with one’s charges by generously advocating the pledging of somebody else’s money. For a 
comprehensive criticism of past experience of aid and its bureaucratic implementation see Easterly 
(2006). For a hefty criticism of Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, see Sachs (2006) and Easterly 
(n.d). 
52 For the ambiguous aspects of debt relief, in particular by the International Financial Institutions, see 
Easterly (2006), pp. 230-236. 
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create an international special fund for the same purpose with taxpayers’ money, in order 
to eliminate, or reduce, the debt without worsening the credit rating of poorer debtors.53 
Nevertheless the worsening of credit rating, and the consequent reduction in the 
capability to borrow, of poorer debtors could have some positive side.54 Often the debt 
problem arises from the propensity of populist and/or corrupt governments to 
overborrow for financing consumption expenditures (the onus and unpopularity of 
servicing the debt will then fall on future governments), or the outright siphoning out of 
hard currency into the foreign bank accounts of the leaders. But a worsening of credit 
rating could also jeopardize the ability to borrow in an emergency or an economic 
downturn or for financing productive investment projects. An obvious fact that is 
overlooked by the debt remission campaign is that whenever the funds that have been 
borrowed are not repaid less is available for lending to other borrowers in need, and this 
is especially obvious with the International Financial Institutions.55  
None of the many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry 
renounce exploiting the intellectual property of Aids drugs, meritoriously discovered at 
the cost of huge investments, has proposed to start a subscription, or to pressurize 
governments for purchasing the corresponding patents at market value, in order to make 
them free for mankind, and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease 
section of world population, such as in Africa.56 An alternative, more practical, way to 
overcome the issue of the excessive cost of patented drugs would be for poorer 
countries not to adhere to the international conventions protecting intellectual property 
rights, but this would put them outside the WTO, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) has become a part of WTO 
agreements.57 As a matter of fact underdeveloped countries have little to gain and much 
to lose from the degree of protection of intellectual property rights contemplated by 
TRIPS. Even if they do not comply, still a large market (that of developed countries), 
where intellectual rights are protected, and innovation is financed by market proceeds, 
would remain.58 With the Doha Declaration the extent of TRIPS has been attenuated, 
and some further development in this direction could be contemplated in future WTO 
negotiations.59 In theory a possible way to reconcile the objective of maintaining 
                                                 
53 On the other hand the creation of such a special fund would bring about an obvious moral hazard 
problem. 
54 On this see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 216 f. 
55 Cf. Stiglitz, 2007, p. 228:“Today, the developing countries that have repaid what was owed … worry that 
debt relief is commandeering money that might otherwise have been available to them”. 
56 However some feasible projects of financing private or public medical research of specific relevance for 
poorer countries, and insufficiently financially rewarding for unfounded private medical research, with 
suitable contracts allowing poorer countries taking advantage through free access of the innovations thus 
produced, have been proposed. This kind of schemes would have the advantage of helping poorer 
countries with aid expenditures bypassing corrupt and inefficient governments, helping, at the same 
time, the production of public goods useful for the whole of mankind. In general aid expenditure 
resulting in the creation of public goods that are of particular interest for poorer countries (for instance 
producing information or educational material) could by-pass their government and administrations and 
remedy at the same time the inefficiencies deriving from the insufficient provision of public goods. 
57 See the entry TRIPS in Wikipedia, and the sources there listed. 
58 On TRIPS and intellectual property issues concerning less developed countries see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 
103-132. 
59 An issue in this respect would be competitive export of goods benefiting of lack of intellectual 
protection to developed economies. But this may not be insurmountable, since the developed economies 
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revenues and private production incentives for intellectual production with that of 
helping the less developed countries could be to transfer part of development aid 
expenditures to national producers of intellectual public goods (preferably through some 
general measures such as tax rebates), while allowing the underdeveloped economies (or 
some of them) their free utilization. The downside is that lack of protection for 
intellectual goods could dampen their production in the underdeveloped world: at a 
certain stage of their development even less developed countries may decide that 
protection is worth the while. In practice it is hard to expect that the developed 
countries, and especially the USA, could allow an attenuation of the protection of 
intellectual goods, owing to the intensity of the lobbying by the industries concerned, 
Indeed, the latter have already succeeded to extend the protection to much higher levels 
than what appears reasonable and economically justifiable.60 
 As far as aid in general is concerned there is the issue of the lasting effects of the 
culture of dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival of 
corrupt and inefficient governments,61 and the old saying that international aid amounts 
to taking away from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of the 
receiving countries, which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of 
international aid.62 What is sometimes overlooked is that aid usually does not directly 
transfer resources to the poorer of the world, since it is governments that act as 
representatives of the inhabitants of a country, and governments in poorer countries are 
often comparatively more corrupt and inefficient.63 There is the damaging possibility that 
aid be simply wasted away and siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even worse, spent in 
                                                                                                                                           
could agree to undertake far-reaching specific import controls. Of more practical relevance may be the 
lack of actual enforcement of the discipline concerning protection of intellectual property, whatever the 
theoretical obligations associated to the underwriting of TRIPS, and the legal measures implemented. 
60 For instance the extension of the economic protection of copyright after 50 years at least after the death 
of the author, contemplated by TRIPS (not to speak of the 70 years of the US or European legislation; 
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_length, and the sources listed there) 
does seem hardly to be required to stimulate the production of intellectual works. How reasonable is it 
to expect that the motivation of an author towards intellectual creation be influenced by the economic 
property rights somebody else may have after his own death (not to speak 50 and more years after)? 
61 According to Knack (1999) “Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, 
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies 
and institutions.” And “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the 
quality of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.” 
62 For the tendency of aid to benefit corrupt and undemocratic governments, see Easterly, 2006, p.133: 
(according to him “aid shifts money from being spent by the best governments in the world to being 
spent by the worst”). For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic 
(October 2007). To his plea for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income 
distribution in the receiving countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may 
add that the degree of inequality may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a 
receiving country, and of its power to appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability 
of the latter acting regressively. 
63 We may refer in this respect to the classification of Transparency International. An extreme case is 
mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government of Chad for 
financing rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to Uganda, where 
“only around 20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary schools, other 
than for teachers’ salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
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armament feeding third world wars.64 It is argued that aid, analogously to natural 
resources windfalls, weakens the determination to reform and to combat corruption and 
may hamper growth through the so-called Dutch disease, by increasing prices and wage 
costs.65 Analogously to the rents from oil and natural resources, and even more than 
them, aid has been found to have a negative impact on democracy.66 Theoretically 
speaking aid could aid reform and better governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, 
besides being strongly resented as a violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of 
richer countries to the detriment of aid receivers, ex-ante conditionality apparently does 
not work in practice, at least with respect to the poorer countries with worse 
governance.67 It is also doubtful whether massive aid transfers, as proposed by some, could 
raise the long term growth prospects, even if they could certainly increase the short-run 
average incomes (but not necessarily the incomes of the poor) of the recipient countries.68 
According to Boone (1995) “Aid does not significantly increase investment and growth, nor 
benefit the poor”.69 On the other hand there is a specific type of aid that the more 
prosperous countries are giving freely and massively, and mostly unintentionally. Through 
the scientific progress and the technological advances they produce, they create public goods 
that deeply affect the economic and social fabrics of less developed countries. This is 
probably the fundamental explanation of the great economic and demographic advances of 
most less developed countries in relation to their past.70 The same applies to the example 
provided by the economic, social and political institutions of more advanced countries, in 
particular to the basic idea of democracy, according to which governments should be 
changed by the ballot, rather than through civil strife and violent means. The latter have 
the fundamental disadvantage, in comparison to the ballot, to be usually much more 
expensive in terms of wasted economic resources, not to speak of the other, non-
economic, profiles. 
4.2.3 Changing the basis of the international economic order 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange 
and market to planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the concrete issue 
of its (in)feasibility, the Comecon experience of planned material exchanges is not really 
enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where barter exchange 
prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and greatly reduced gains from trading. 
To some extent distribution is internationally, as well as inside nations, a consequence of 
the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect production and exchange. 
The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity and growth (such as the 
remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from the unfortunate 
                                                 
64 According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
65 Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
66 See Djankov et alii (2006). 
67 Collier (2007b), pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the 
development of  “the bottom million”, see chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
68 For a sceptical view on the ability of aid  to raise growth of the recipient countries, see in particular 
Easterly, 2006, ch. 2, pp. 60-55. 
69 For the discussion following Boone’s controversial paper, and further interesting contributions on the 
issue, see Easterly (2006), pp. 45-50. 
70 See below, tables 5 to 9. 
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“bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the century the unprecedented rate 
of 4 per cent per capita, and even more in the first years of the new millennium)71 have 
some distributional consequences that only partially can be mitigated without affecting 
economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those institutions could be against the 
interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a world where at least 60% of 
one’s position in the global personal income distribution can be explained by the 
accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, and a good deal of the 
rest by the accident of having been born in a family rather than in another.72 In reality 
the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution appear to lie inside countries 
through reform of their institutions and the political process. In lower and middle 
income countries, with good natural resource endowments in particular, the specific 
extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and balances, 
often leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the resulting high 
degree of inequality (at a Gini coefficient of 40 and above) represents a brake to growth 
rather than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and social processes,73 not to 
speak about the much higher risk of civil war and instability associated with 
“dependence upon primary commodity exports”.74 
The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to 
make of the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and 
enact redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kind of 
institutions and economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have; not 
necessarily the best ones, owing to the actual composition of its potential citizenship. 
But for good or for worse humanity is divided into separate territorial states and 
solidarity towards the citizens of other states is much lesser than solidarity towards 
fellow citizens, or even more, wherever there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, 
towards one’s own ethnic community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the 
outcome of the fact that citizens, however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore 
have some scope for influencing, through collective action, the political process, albeit 
with quite different degrees, according to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, 
for the time being, the only legitimate context within which relative deprivation can be 
addressed through redistributive policies and practices”, and “it is at the level of states 
only that the principles of distributive justice can and may apply, as it is on this level 
alone that we have the institutional means to legitimately take from the rich and give to 
the poor”. For good or for worse, people will belong to separate states for a long time to 
come, rather than being simply citizens of the world, and this will limit the degree of 
                                                 
71 Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are 
also mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
72 See Milanovic (2008).  
73 See Nel (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
74 Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of the exploitation of natural resources and the 
utilization of the rents thereof would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.)  
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solidarity and redistribution at the world level.75 John Lennon’s utopia of Imagine there's no 
countries …. Nothing to kill or die for -- And no religion too is unfortunately very far off.  
4.2.4 The problem of the “fragile” states 
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called 
fragile states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and 
capacity…often in conflict”76 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the 
origin of “fragility”), which did not partake of recent world economic growth, and are 
plagued by particularly high problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and 
illiteracy. Short of neo-colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only 
way seems to hope that, favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional 
imitation, and possibly through the help of the international community, their internal 
dynamics could evolve so as to bring about a more favourable environment, in particular 
through the overcoming of the violent conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, 
a greater participation in peace keeping by the international community in order to 
reduce the probability to conflict reversion could be the best form of aid. 77 As to peace 
enforcing, and nation and institution building, this is a much more tricky issue, because 
of its neo-colonialist connotations and implied violation of national sovereignty, lack of 
consensus by the international community, and lack of volunteers to offer the needed 
resources and face the inevitable losses and expenditures. One may just be left with the 
solution to end the patronizing approach,78 and to leave fragile states to do their own 
experiences, as everybody else has done in the past, and learn through generations how 
to progress, forming and changing their own institutions. But our world has become 
much more impatient with historical time, and a country’s internal disturbances may 
severely impact on their neighbours, not only as a consequence of the collapse of trade 
following the collapse of the economy, but particularly by originating massive sudden 
migrations, and the spreading abroad of internal disturbances, as well as diseases.79 We 
may just remind the disastrous consequences of Ruanda’s internal conflicts on 
Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of Mugabe’s follies for the internal peace of South 
Africa. The consequences of failed states can be indeed very severe, even if only the 
economically measurable aspects are taken into consideration.80 
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones 
due to colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of 
the transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on 
                                                 
75 Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
76 World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
77 As advocated notably by Paul Collier. 
78 Exposed and lamented by Easterly and others (Easterly, 2006, pp. 26-27). 
79 Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
80 According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. Collier’s quantitative analysis, as well his favourable attitude to peace keeping and peace 
enforcement are severely criticized by Easterly (2007), according to whom “If Collier’s statistical analysis 
does not hold up under scrutiny, unfortunately, then his recommendations are not a reliable guide for 
deploying foreign aid, technical assistance, or armies. Economists should not be allowed to play games 
with statistics, much less with guns” (p. 1476).  
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European shoulders? Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into 
the first issue (Milanovic, 2005). According to his quantitative analysis on a large 
historical statistical data base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on 
balance the economic development either of colonial powers or of colonies.81 One may 
add that however repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a 
militarily weaker country and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the 
countries that were conquered and subjected were not usually peaceful prosperous 
heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical game, of 
violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that only quite 
recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by most part of humanity (see 
below).82 In the history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, evil (what 
we moderns consider evil) was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false 
pretensions.83 As is often the case in what we may see as the progress of the moral 
awareness of humanity, some activities that in an epoch are considered as legitimate, 
come up to be subsequently perceived as crimes. The history of mankind is a dense 
collection of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity, 
and even in sacred books genocides can be extolled as acts of pious obedience to God.84 
 Tied to the issue of the evaluation of the present economic order is the issue of 
the historical responsibility of the West in the plight of the Rest. Overall the impact of 
the West has been mixed. On the one hand it has played with greater efficiency, owing 
to its recent technological superiority, the same deadly games that most of humanity has 
played for most of the time(contrary to some idealistic visions, the Rest was not usually 
populated by pacific savages). On the other it has spread modern social and 
technological innovations, with dramatic consequences in terms of improvement of the 
economic and living standards of most of the Rest. It has also spread its germs, with a 
deadly  impact for some populations, in particular in South America.85 But in the 
historical interaction of peoples it is difficult to do cherry picking: the same technological 
and organizational dominance that has made the West deadly for some has brought 
about the improvement of the living standards of the many through almost universal 
imitation. This is not to deny the terrible crimes associated with slave trade or colonial 
domination. But in this the West has shared the crimes of the Rest, only taking 
advantage of its better technological and organizational capabilities. Slavery has been 
almost universal institution of  human civilization. If the … the West has brought about 
                                                 
81 This is consistent with the fact that “colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and 
investment of developed countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world 
trade and investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the half 
century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly in other developed  
countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements of the developed countries were 
other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, France, and Germany together, on the eve of 
World War II their own Third World colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade 
and 12 percent of their foreign investment” (ibidem, p. 43). 
82 For an outline of the history of African autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see 
Collins and Burns (2007). 
83 Such as saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull Romanus Pontifex, 
legitimizing the slave trade (Maddison, 2006, p 60), or King Leopold’s pretension to administer Congo 
for exclusive humanitarian purposes.  
84 Such as the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
85 See Diamond (1997). 
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its demise. Thus, while considering the overall impact of the West on the Rest, one 
cannot separate the negative aspects of its interrelation from the positive impact that the 
diffusion of western technological advances has had on the demographic and economic 
expansion of the Rest as a whole. Let us turn now to the specific responsibility of the 
West on slavery. Slavery has been practiced by humanity from time immemorial, and 
probably very few parts of the earth have been immune. Africa has certainly been no 
exception.86 Trans-Saharan slave trade in particular was practised to a large scale before 
the encroachment of the Europeans, but also slave trade towards Asia was substantial.87 
With the advantage of European technology and organization, and pulled by the demand 
of the new plantation economies of the New World, slave trade reached from the 
sixteenth century onward unheard of dimensions. But in partaking blames and 
responsibilities one should consider that European traders were taking care of transport 
and marketing, while the actual production of slaves was the domain of the Africans 
themselves and, even before the transatlantic trade, the capture and trade of slaves was 
one of the main economic activities of Sub-Saharan Africa. If to the demerit and shame 
of the Europeans should be ascribed the massive extent of the transatlantic trade, to 
their merit and honour it must be attributed having made slave trade and slavery illegal, 
extending the prohibition of slavery to their colonial domains, thus bringing to an end a 
time immemorial historical tradition of slavery and slave trade. 88  
6. The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, accompanied by high birth 
rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective could have 
been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either continuously, 
leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature deaths), or 
episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play. First of all very 
high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself probably a 
function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of neglect 
and of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible neglect of 
the elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases (which was 
favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of agricultural 
societies). Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, leading to 
direct deaths, as well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources otherwise 
available for survival.89 Still, following the improvements of agricultural technology in 
particular, there was some population growth at a very slow pace, slightly accelerating in 
                                                 
86 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
87 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
88 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and 1833 “Slavery 
Abolition Act”. For a more comprehensive picture see Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline”. 
89 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. As to pre-industrial civilizations 
it is enough to recall world and European history (for instance, considering European history 
immediately preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars 
involving the major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). 
For the issue of population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey  of the relevant literature, see 
Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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time, as shown in table 6.90 Later on, especially since the half of the nineteenth century, 
the decrease in mortality rates (a true “mortality revolution” “which has resulted in 
doubling or more of average life expectancy at birth”91 and has been the direct 
consequence of the diffusion of medical knowledge and discoveries that has followed 
with some delay the Industrial Revolution) has led to a much faster population growth, 
while the demographic consequences of two world wars and related upheavals are 
shown in a temporary decrease of growth rates. The post World War II period has seen 
an unprecedented population explosion, with some signs of abating however following 
increasing living standards and progresses in the technology of birth control, spreading 
from the more advanced countries to the lesser developed areas of the world, leading to 
a forecast of about 9.2 billion around the year 2050.92 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population 
explosion? Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy 
(see the tables in the Statistical Appendix at the end). The birth rate has on the whole 
decreased in the post-war period, but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger; 
17 years between 1950 to 1999 in the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the 
first half of the twentieth century, three times more than the increase of life expectancy 
in the crucial eighty years of the spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. 
One may also note that all the areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in 
life expectancy,93 while the present inequality in average life expectancy between the 
different areas (about 50% between the highest, Western Europe, and the lowest, 
Africa), is much lower than either in wealth or in income (see the Statistical Appendix; 
with respect to some other life statistics, however, the picture is more extreme). 
Moreover, “differences in lifetime survival rates between rich and poor countries and 
between rich and poor individuals within countries were much higher two centuries ago 
than they are now”.94 One of the reasons of the population explosion in the post WWII 
period lies in the impact of the Green Revolution in third world countries, such as 
Mexico and India, leading to the strong growth of agricultural production, as well as in 
the improvements in transportation.95 There was no major demographic catastrophe, of 
                                                 
90 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), 
even if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one 
implied above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. 
However this could be the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist 
at any given time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a 
lengthy historical process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the other 
hand Boserup’s argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological progress 
in agriculture being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 f.).  
91 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
92 Cf. United Nations, 2006. 
93 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
94 Milanovic et alii, 2007, p. 28. 
95 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined 
forces. The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the 
productivity of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on 
agricultural growth see ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and 
Latin America, the methods of the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and 
environmental obstacles (on this see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But taking 
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the kind that in the old times were blocking demographic advance in a secular 
perspective.96 (For some relevant demographic data we may refer to the statistical 
appendix at the end.) 
 
Table 6. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-200797 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern 
Europe 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots98 0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia 
excl. Japan 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.1599 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
 
                                                                                                                                           
into account the increasing integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some 
countries can have a favourable impact on the food balance in others through their effect on world 
prices anyway. 
96 Such as in the case of the Black Death. The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post 
War II period could have been a population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of 
millions Chinese as a consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the 
growth rate from 1959-1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both 
natural disasters and decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused 
China's death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 
18/7/2007; the dip could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate 
reported in the site of the World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the 
three years 1959-61 was somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and 
the rest lost births. Not a big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 
billion. For other estimates one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe 
(1987). 
97 Source of the data of the last column: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison (2006), p. 637. 
98 USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
99 One may be puzzled by the acceleration of the demographic development of Africa in a period of 
massive slave transatlantic trade. The answer seems to lie in the fact that “although some areas of Africa 
were depleted by slave raiding, on balance the African population grew after the establishment of the 
transatlantic slave trade because of new food crops introduced from the New World, particularly 
manioc, corn (maize), and possibly peanuts” (Hellie, 2007). Cf. also Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 198-
199, 311 (p. 199: “The introduction of New World and Asian crops transformed many African 
agricultural societies, enabling them to expand into the vast unpopulated lands of the continent.”); 
Maddison, 2006, p. 569. The demographic consequences of the new crops were somewhat compensated 
however by the spread of new diseases brought by the Europeans (Collins and Burns, pp. 199-200). 
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7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly 
increased (about three times; an unheard of performance in the past) since the spreading 
to the whole world of the present mode of production that followed the industrial 
revolution (see Table 7). This has taken place notwithstanding the rapid population 
growth, which in the post World War II years has become the highest in the world 
(2.69% yearly in the period 1973-2001, somewhat decreased to 2,36% in the last six 
years; cf. Table 6).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the 
length of the historical period covered), per capita income has decreased in Western 
Europe during the first 1000 years of our era, from 450PP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for 
the physical subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very 
slow recovery.100 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita 
incomes being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 
1000AD), and in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining areas were still at low 
subsistence level (400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some 
modest progress (from 436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, 
but was stagnating until the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to 
become the Western Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined 
at 414, stagnating until the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had 
progressed from 450 to 600, staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, 
down to 439 in 1950, Japan also progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of 
the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the richest world country were the Netherlands with 
2130, Western Europe was somewhat lower than 1000PPP$ on average.101 
                                                 
100 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, 
p. 115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990 PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the 
times of Augustus. 
101 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
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Table 7. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD102 (1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars)103 
 1  1000  1500  1600 1700 1820 1870 1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1 204 1 960 3 458  4 579  11,416 19,256
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1 695  2 111  4 988  6 027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1 488  2 841  6 059  4 626  
Western 
Offshoots 400  400  400  400  476  1 202 2 419 5 233  9 268  16,179 26,943 
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1 481  2 506  4 504  5 811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1 387  1 921  11,434 20,683 
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1 226  3 256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1 410  1 489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1 525  2 111  4 091  6 049  
 
Economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by a great 
reduction, in many cases almost a halving, since 1870, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, 
p. 347). And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351). 
Notwithstanding the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly 
increased (about ten times since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349).  
                                                 
102 Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
103 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. Perusing the above data it becomes 
obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of redistribution could have ever 
brought about the dramatic improvement in the living standards of the masses that technical progress 
and development (“the development of productive forces”) would have brought about in less than a life-
span. Thus Marx (1875) was right in downplaying the issue of distribution as such. Distribution may be 
important in the short-run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run for 
the worse off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical improvements, production 
and accumulation. 
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Table 8104Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1820 1820–1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR 0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21 
 
 
Table 9.105 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.810 01.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
 
                                                 
104 Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643). 
105 Data taken from Maddison (2006, p. 643). 
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8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to the Malthusian 
viewpoint 
Fig. 1 The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark106  
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up to 
the dawn of industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink of 
physical survival. In a very long perspective there was by and large a Malthusian 
equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak long run growth, 
amounting to near stagnation, of world population.107 Under such circumstances 
distribution of income and wealth affects in the long run the size of the population 
(because unequal distribution uses up resources that could allow a larger population to 
subsist), not the living standards of the masses. At the same time the existence of 
privileged strata, which in the short run at least are somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, 
can affect the well being of the worse off through the externalities they generate. These 
could be negative (envy and the sense of relative deprivation) or positive (the hope, 
however slim, to be able to raise among the privileged, some identification with their 
interest and life experience).108 Their relative impact may depend, among others, on the 
                                                 
106 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
107 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
108 According to Kenny (2006), and the empirical enquires reported by him, economic and social 
inequalities can have a powerful negative effect on subjective measures of poverty and deprivation, so 
their impact in the past, when they were associated with even greater differences in status and rights than 
in the present times, could have been more devastating than nowadays. Kenny also underlines the 
negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare or happiness. But 
happiness is a rather subjective matter, as is well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a ciascun 
l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” (If 
everybody’ s internal pain were written on their forehead, many who are envied now, would be pitied 
instead.) As economists, we may content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with a lot of 
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degree of mobility in the society concerned. Religion could surrogate mobility in this 
world with a belief in mobility in the afterworld. Even in the slave society of ancient 
Rome slaves had some degree of hope to be liberated, and even to become affluent or, 
in Christian times, to earn after death, alike their rich masters, and ever more than they, 
the Kingdom of Heaven. Moreover the existence of some strata that were able to enjoy a 
surplus over subsistence could have been an engine (however very inefficient) of 
progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing the resources for some to 
devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual long run benefits for 
average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind. Other utilizations of 
surplus were for collective purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the 
latter possibly being in itself one of the principal instruments, through their disruptive 
consequences, of population control. The working of Malthusian limits could have 
affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; however greater 
population density could have lead to more advanced production techniques and modes 
of organization, in particular through the division of labour and increasing returns to 
scale.109 Moreover, even if the Malthusian trap had worked in the very long-run, in the 
shorter run there may have been long periods (such as after the Black Death) when 
population growth was compatible with some improvement in average living standards. 
Thus in the shorter run how wealth (land ownership in particular) was distributed could 
have made a great deal of difference for the well being of the bulk of the population. 
The pressure of population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the 
tendency to demographic growth either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. 
Historically speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would 
first of all be based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in later 
ages. In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural 
conditions could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult 
mortality, and lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards 
than in later more densely populated agricultural societies. This could be the reason 
explaining the paradox of the alleged lower living standards in agricultural in relation to 
hunter-gatherers societies.110 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, Socialism and 
Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history poverty and starvation have been 
the rule, wealth and affluence a tiny exception in a sea of misery and precarious lives. So 
the real historical singularity that must be explained is not poverty and backwardness, 
but development and wealth. If the issue of relative poverty and underdevelopment 
arises from the economic development of the countries that have become well off rather 
than from some countries having made worse off in an absolute sense, it is to the 
development of poorer countries that one should turn for getting rid of the issue, as well 
as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, absolute poverty. In a number of 
                                                                                                                                           
caveats, among others of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also 
Easterlin, 1996, pp. 131-144. 
109 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
110 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
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countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, in others, particularly in Africa, 
seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase in population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the 
very rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the 
outcome of a mode of production characterized by the systematic application to 
production of scientific principles, and organized pursuit of scientific and technological 
progress, dramatically improving the living prospects of billions of men and women, as a 
consequence of the basic “idea of the world as open to transformation by human 
intervention.”111 According to conventional wisdom its ultimate sources may be found in 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together by the Reformation’s critical 
discussion of traditional received faith. Until the Soviet Revolution this mode of 
production took the organizational form and vehicle of transmission of the internal and 
international capitalist market. This does not detract anything from the role performed 
by the state, in particular as provider of public goods and infrastructure, but the basic 
principle of economic functioning was voluntary exchange, and it is on voluntary 
exchange, and the creation and expansion of markets, as made possible by the creation 
of a mercantile economy and the gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear 
attribution of property rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its 
aftermath can be attributed. According to conventional wisdom in this lies the difference 
with other environments of the past (such as historical China or the Arab world at its 
apogee) where scientific progress and innovations did not translate into sustained 
economic and technological progress. Real socialism can be seen just as a specific variety 
of this mode of production whereby the fundamental aspects have been upheld through 
a sort of rough extension of the rational organizing principle to the whole of society, and 
accumulation and innovation have been organized from the centre rather than having 
been the outcome of the working of market forces. Eventually this daring experiment 
has encountered a bitter dead end, but in the process it has partaken both of the increase 
in population and the increase in aggregate production. Its failure has been a 
comparative failure, but still its achievements in aggregate economic and life statistical 
terms may be seen as substantial in relation to pre-industrial epochs. If we are willing to 
indulge a little bit in counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism had prevailed 
throughout the world by way of revolution and/or military conquest, destroying the 
international market system in the process. It is conceivable that after the initial 
disruptive consequences of the change of system some process of increasing world 
wealth and population would have persisted anyway. Of course there is the issue as to 
the extent to which the survival of Soviet type socialism would have been helped in 
practice from the contemporary existence of an international capitalist economy, from 
which to draw technology, as well as goods (such as foodstuffs) for whose production 
Soviet-type socialism was utterly less proficient, and an international price system easing 
the difficult task of evaluating economic opportunities. But let us abstract from the latter 
point. Would it have been enough to argue that no better system is possible and to 
ascribe to the very nature of real socialism the economic and demographic outcomes? In 
this respect two viewpoints seem to be equally objectionable: that a really existing, and 
therefore highly imperfect, system of production must be rejected because its 
performance is seen as defective, and another abstractly implementable system (socialism 
                                                 
111 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
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vs. capitalism) should do better; as well the opposite contention that no better system of 
organization (in our counterfactual example capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is 
possible.112 A further consideration refers to the heavy cost of transition, as borne out in 
what follows by life statistical data. If compared with the case of China’s transition away 
from the Maoist system, this may exemplify the heavy toll of revolution as compared to 
evolution. Indeed transition in the former socialist camp has amounted to a, by and large 
pacific, but on the whole very disruptive, revolution led by institutional constructivism, 
the idea that everything can be explained by legal institutions, irrespective of the social 
and historical environment where these institutions are nested.113 One may also think in 
this respect of a second best theorem (as a consequence of institutional 
complementarity): whenever institutions from a superior environment (in the sense that 
on its whole it brings about superior results) are introduced in an environment where the 
complementary institutions (which may well be of a tacit nature) are missing this can 
actually lead to a worsening, rather than to a betterment, of performance, until the 
complementary institutions are introduced, or a suitable adaptation of the overall 
institutional framework takes place. 
10. Post-war development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have already mentioned, a most remarkable fact is that the world has 
never grown so fast, as to population and wealth, as in the post World War II period.114 
We have considered the possible causes: globalization (in particular the great 
intensification of international trade and investment), technical progress (and the 
progress of medicine), originating in the European countries and Anglo-European 
offshoots; in particular progress in transportation and agriculture,115 and the absence of 
devastating conflicts at the global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear 
global disaster, but it didn’t fall into the precipice, yet). 
Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian 
trap is still lurking. But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may be here relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources, and in 
particular the retroaction, on development and living standards, of the possible 
“tragedies of the commons”, including climate change.116 The industrial and 
demographic developments that have accompanied the present relative prosperity have 
taken place at the cost of world’s commons, in particular at the cost of the decumulation 
in the span of two hundred years of huge reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of 
                                                 
112 Following Demsetz (1969) economists dubb the first of the two views as Nirvana fallacy. 
113 The issue of the best strategy of transition is a complex and most debated one. A crucial factor 
constraining transition strategies was of course the fact that the economic and political system in the 
European ex-communist countries was rotten from the inside, and its credibility and social support was 
low, rendering a path of gradual economic reform difficult to follow.  
114 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
115 Of particular importance for the provision of the basic means of survival have been the progresses in 
transportation and agriculture. For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, 
but especially in the post-second world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the 
most exceptional growth of population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture 
spearheading, alongside industry, modern economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
116 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
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hundreds of millions of years of life on earth.117 To this one may add the destruction of 
forests and pristine habitats, the pollution or air and water, and, last but not least, CO2 
emissions. The plunder has mostly taken place to the advantage of industrialized 
countries, and of countries provided with large reserves of raw materials (in particular 
hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their exploitation. On the other hand the 
overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries cannot be considered as negative, 
since in the process their average living standards (considering both per capita income 
and life statistics) have greatly improved all the same, as a consequence of the diffusion 
of the technological advances of the West, notwithstanding the colonial domination to 
which most of them had been subjected in the past. But as more and more countries 
successfully pursue the type of industrialization and economic development that has 
made rich the West and better off the emerging economies, the pressure on resources 
and the enhanced generation of externalities may exert a negative feedback elsewhere, 
especially on the living standards of the countries deprived of natural resources, with 
potential destabilizing consequences on the economy and the peace of the world.118 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on 
the one hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including world commons). 
Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either at the 
individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of natality 
accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it may be 
favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have 
constrained the development of population in history. Once demographic developments 
are considered an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present 
themselves: Is it better in presence of limited resources to have many overlapping 
generations with short lives, or fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how 
long, and how many generations? How many  people for each generation? Many people 
with low living standards, or few ones with higher living standards? And how low or 
how high?119 In this respect one should be reminded of the old saying “more souls more 
joy”. Ceteris paribus, the larger the population the greater the number of possible 
originators of new ideas and discoveries, from which the progress of humanity (however 
conceived) ensues, and the greater the number of possible contacts and personal 
interactions, favouring the development of ideas. At the same time there may be some 
trade-off between quantity a quality: a smaller better educated population could be more 
conducive to economic and intellectual progress than a larger uneducated one living at 
the margin of survival. Theoretically speaking we can have a dynamic equilibrium 
                                                 
117 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living 
standards of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean 
and plentiful new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy either in the development of its fission or 
even more, perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
118 Among the important externalities associated to the growth of production there is the global warming 
that would damage some countries while favouring other ones. This could be another important 
destabilizing factor. 
119 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of 
the Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of 
Trantor, the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the 
very sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with 
few (mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
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whereby high population growth spurs fast technological progress, the latter higher per 
capita incomes, which would retroact in maintaining the momentum of technical 
progress and of demographic and economic growth, compensating Malthusian static 
decreasing returns.120 
11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
It is obvious however that a demographic explosion such as that of the last 
decades cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in 
astronomical arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the first windmill generation 
turbine), according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple living not 
long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its members had 
expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than the present 
rate of growth of world population], the world population would form today a sphere of 
living flesh many thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial velocity 
that, neglecting relativity, would be many times faster than light.” 
A correction to the process of world overpopulation could be found in a 
decreasing birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the extension 
of social security systems into the countries where the survival of the elderly is otherwise 
dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the technology 
of birth control. Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and evidence 
indicate that the population explosion is a transient phase of contemporary development 
experience”, since in developing countries “the more rapid the Mortality Revolution, the 
more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, albeit with different speed and 
modalities, the demographic transition of present developed countries. But can one 
really discount the possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a 
consequence of further medical discoveries after the transition to lower fertility is over, 
or that preferences regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of different 
culture in developing countries, or preferences regarding procreation could change even 
in the developed world, altering the dynamic demographic balance? Preferences and 
science cannot really be considered as given in the long-run.  
The shape of a future long-run population equilibrium, absent a sudden 
demographic catastrophe, could entail a low mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life 
span, and a marked increase in the average population age. Perhaps a senescent 
population will be less dynamic but wiser.121 While we can think of demographic policies 
affecting the size of a population at the country level (even if a country could represent 
an important part of the world population, such as China), it seems hardly possible that 
demographic policies could be devised and implemented at the world level (such as 
advocated notably by Julian Huxley122) in order to take into account the important 
                                                 
120 On the relation between population growth, technical progress, and per capita incomes see Kremer 
(1993). 
121 And more endowed by experience. On the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 
1996, p. 124. For the economic consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
122 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how 
many children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, 
that you have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And 
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externalities that individual decisions regarding procreation have for the world as a 
whole.123 In the past demographic control, contrasting the operation of the Malthusian 
trap, was often ensured by custom, involving habits such as organized celibacy (as in 
monastic orders), repression of sexuality, and late marriages (the way out praised by 
Malthus himself), systematic infanticide, or belligerent habits leading to an increase of 
adult mortality.124 Under conditions of progressively increasing life expectancy 
demographic control could assume the form of some limitation to the length of life, if 
not explicitly and legally binding as in the dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,125 in the 
more subtle form of denying life supporting medical treatment and, possibly, the 
economic means of survival, to the elderly. 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to held populations in 
check through recurrent catastrophes: epidemic diseases, famines, and war, the impact of 
epidemic diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine, and even the 
definitive cure or prevention through vaccination of the AIDS epidemics appears only 
question of time. Of course the possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic 
disease, such as aviary influenza, is always possible, but only with temporarily limited 
consequences, until, presumably, medical research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation 
as a consequence of famine has been largely overcome by progresses in transportation 
and agricultural technique, with the possible exception of countries plagued by war and 
heavy internal disturbances. Even if at the moment tensions are re-surfacing on the 
international food market, following increased demand and the ill-advised subsidization 
of fuel producing crops, another agricultural revolution is in progress through the 
development of OGMs, which, notwithstanding misgivings and preconceived hostilities, 
seems essentially a foregone development. The impact of the new revolution appears 
more far-reaching and of potentially much greater impact than the previous one, because 
of the much faster process of scientific plant breeding, and the much greater potential of 
invention of new varieties suitable for the most various environmental conditions.126 
However, alike the Green Revolution, and even more than the latter, the OGMs 
revolution also presents specific problems of compatibility to the various natural and 
institutional environments, especially in less developed countries. Obstacles to its 
spreading are presented by the specific nature of its associated private property rights, 
and consequent hindrances to imitation of privately owned know-how.127 The latter 
aspect could be partly overcome through internationally concerted public action, 
involving in particular public, instead of private, funding of research. Moreover public 
international funding could be provide an opportunity to direct research in areas which, 
                                                                                                                                           
if you have an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or 
anything of that sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-
control, and it means help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) 
Fictionally, there is far-reaching demographic planning in Julian’s brother Aldous Huxley dystopian 
novel Brave New World (1932). 
123 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is 
Friedman (1972). 
124 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
contexts, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
125 Petri (1965). 
126 See Cuffaro, 2001, p. 139 
127 Ibidem, pp. 136-144. 
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while privately unprofitable, may contribute to stave off humanitarian crises, and help 
development, of poorer countries subject to environmental degradation. All in all the 
potentially most destructive factor, besides some sudden environmental disaster, could 
be eventually war, as a consequence of the spreading of atomic technology and of 
international tensions building up in an increasingly overcrowded and progressively 
shrinking world.128  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
12.1 The economic consequences of war and peace in historical perspective 
The game humanity played in the past, when conquest, plunder, territorial 
expansion and domination, slavery, torture and mass killings were respectable 
endeavours and part of the rules of the game, and mass murderers acquired the status of 
national heroes, still remembered and glorified in monuments and history books, has led 
on the whole to very poor results, as measured at least in terms of demographic and 
economic growth.129 However the real extent to which wars were contributing to hold in 
check the progress of humanity is difficult to gauge. A strict Malthusian could object that 
living standards and population would have been held in check by Malthusian factors 
anyway. But certainly wars brought about untold suffering and destructions both of 
physical and, even more, of human capital, subtracting resources which could have been 
better used in principle towards economic and cultural progress. At the same time they 
tended to bring to the fore populations and civilizations notable for their destructive and 
coercive power rather than for their peaceful achievements. Whatever the reasons until 
recent times the progress of humanity, both in terms of population and of productive 
achievements, was so slow as to amount, in our present perception of time, more to 
stagnation than to growth, with long spans of regression. The first millennium of the 
vulgar era was for Europe a lost millennium: the decadence and fall of the Roman 
Empire and the dislocations following the barbaric invasions left Europe worse off 
economically in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new Christian nations, than at the time 
of the birth of Jesus Christ. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial overcoming 
of the Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near long run 
stagnation, according to a modern perspective, in world population and economy), had 
to wait until the Industrial Revolution gradually spread all over the world. But it has been 
the peace period after the Second World War (localized conflicts notwithstanding) that 
has led to the greatest acceleration in the speed of demographic and economic advance 
the world has ever known in its history. 
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses in 
principle the model of wars of aggression directed to the enlargement of national 
borders and the acquisition of new territories.130 In the post war period these have been 
                                                 
128 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies 
of this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension 
building processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources and the 
environment. 
129 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005).  
130 Waging a war of aggression, in particular, has been made an international crime in the charter of the 
United Nations (art. 39). It is not particularly tranquillizing however that this provision had a precedent 
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very limited: Tibet’s conquest by Mao’s China, Timor-Leste’s conquest by Indonesia, 
Western Sahara’s annexation by Morocco, Saddam Hussein’s expansionary wars aimed 
to acquire new territories, in Iran first, and through the annexation of Kuwait later, and 
the wars of Yugoslav succession, renovating the old bloody Balkan wars. 
In the past a war of conquest had some rationality since the natural productive 
foundations on which to re-start a growth process were largely unaffected by 
catastrophic events, as the foundation of wealth and survival was agriculture. Things 
appear differently with the drastic change in the economic basis and the advances in 
military technology. .The prosperity of the advanced countries relies on very delicate 
social and economic mechanisms and  a much greater surplus could be enjoyed through 
voluntary exchange than through conquest and enslavement. This was the point raised 
by Angell (1913) on the eve of the First World War, declaring its impossibility on 
rational economic considerations.131 Eventually, the “impossible” war broke out, with 
catastrophic economic (not to speak of the non-economic) consequences for everybody 
concerned, putting a halt to the successful economic progress of the “belle époque”. 
War is indeed an eminently destructive endeavour that not always can be avoided on the 
basis of strictly rational considerations. Moreover “not the facts, but men’s belief about 
facts, shapes their conduct”.132  
12.2 The economic consequences of the Bomb 
The economic argument against war becomes much more compelling with 
nuclear technology. The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the 
propensity towards armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired 
nuclear status there have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike in the past, none of 
these tensions has led to open war. Since it has become a nuclear power, Arab countries 
have ceased to wage open war to Israel. At the same time, in case an open conflict 
between atomic powers were to erupt, the consequences could be disastrous, and not 
only for the countries concerned. In the present world the victory in a nuclear war would 
be a Pyrrhic one, since the conquered territories would stay contaminated and 
unproductive for the foreseeable future, 133 and the wealth of the defeated would be 
destroyed with their physical destruction, not to speak of the losses of the victor. Until 
now this entirely rational consideration (as well as the fear for the enormous losses of a 
nuclear war) has prevented wars between nuclear powers. But unfortunately hate, which 
may be totally destructive, can be a stronger motivation than greed.134 Moreover the 
return to the old days when the balance of power was ensuring a precarious equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                           
in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations but this did not hinder Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union attacking Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the Second World War! 
131 “It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by 
subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another” (Angel, 1913, p. ix). 
132 Ibidem. 
133 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
134 Indeed, the object of hate is in damaging or destroying the other, greed amounts to benefiting 
themselves irrespective of the welfare of the others, but it does not necessarily imply their destruction. 
Sometimes it may even imply caring for the welfare of the others, if their survival or collaboration is to 
the advantage of the greedy. 
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between “conservative” and “revisionist” powers135 would entail enormous dangers: an 
international equilibrium based on the balance of powers, rather than on commonly 
shared values, may lead to war whenever the balance is altered, or seen in the process of 
being altered. Moreover, the future may bring about the impossibility of having a balance 
of military power because of the net economic and military dominance of some large 
and assertive, potentially “revisionist”, and expansionist, actors. Poison pills by weaker 
powers, such as the potential of derailing a conventional war into a nuclear war, with 
terrible consequences for the stronger aggressor, even in case the weaker is defeated, 
could in the future restrain military aggression by dominant powers, albeit not some kind 
of suicidal attacks by those motivated by hate and unrestrained by the prospects of their 
own destruction. But also stronger powers could be tricked in gambling from their 
position of strength, and their delusion could bring about untold consequences on 
economic and demographic progress. 
13. Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the 
history of mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to 
which we have become used to in the post-war years and the different parts of the globe 
and the different populations become so close. Never has world population increased at 
a faster rate. Never have overall life statistics improved in such a substantial way. Still, an 
important part of humanity lives precarious lives under appalling conditions of absolute 
poverty, but its relative share, and in more recent times even its absolute numbers, have 
steadily decreased. In the continuation, and possibly the intensification, of this process 
may lie the hope to eventually overcome world poverty (at least in absolute terms). At 
the basis of those achievements there has been a system of production and of 
organization (whatever its specific variations in the different countries and the different 
times) that has put to the fore the systematic pursuit of technical progress, and its 
utilization in all aspects of economic life, while providing the drive and the incentives to 
do so. A contributing factor has been the intensification and acceleration of world 
economic and non-economic exchanges (“globalization”). But this same system has also 
brought about the utilization of technical progress for making increasingly more 
destructive the technology of warfare. For the first time in history mankind has 
produced the military technology that has the potential to lead to its own demise. The 
danger of global thermonuclear warfare has kept the world by and large at relative peace 
for more than sixty years, quite an unprecedented achievement that has presumably very 
much contributed to the overall positive results. But even if the danger appears to have 
decreased with the end of the Cold War, the potential for large scale destruction remains, 
and may increase with the spreading of nuclear technology in presence of persisting or 
even increasing nationalistic drives, especially by resurging old imperial powers. As 
always has been the case in history, prosperity and economic progress are by no means 
foregone conclusions.  
                                                 
135 Such as seemingly aimed for by Russia, striving to build up a security alliance with China against the 
West. 
 - 35 -
References 
Angell, Norman, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage. 
London: William Heinemann, 1913 (reprint in April 1913 of the September 1912 edition). A 
selection from the author's synopsis and concluding chapter can be downloaded at World War I 
Document Archive, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Main_Page 
Asimov, Isaac, Foundation and Earth. London, Grafton Books, 1986 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 
Boeri, Tito, Gordon Hanson and Barry McCormick, Immigration Policy and the Welfare System. Oxford: 
Oxford Un. Press, 2002 
Boone, Peter D., “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid”. NBER Working Paper Series, 
working paper 5308, October 1995. 
Boserup, Ester, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population 
Pressure. London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1965 
Bourguignon, Francois, and Christian Morrisson, “Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992”. 
American Economic Review, vol. 92, n.4 (September  2002), pp. 727-744 
Briggs, Asa, “Technology and Economic Development”, in Briggs, Asa et alii (1963) 
Briggs, Asa et al., Technology and Economic Development: A Scientific American Book. Penguin: 
Harmondsworth, 1963 
Caldwell, John C. and Bruce K. Caldwell, “Pretransitional Population Control and Equilibrium”. 
Population Studies, Vol. 57,  n. 2, 2003, pp. 199-21 
Caldwell, John C. and Thomas Schindlmayr, “Historical Population Estimates: Unraveling the 
Consensus”. Population and Development Review, Vol. 28, n. 2. (Jun., 2002), pp. 183-204 
Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravaillon, “How Have the World's Poorest Fared Since the Early 1980s?", 
Word Bank Research Observer, vol. 19, n° 2 (Fall 2004), accessed at 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/Introduction.jsp 
Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravaillon, “Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 1981-
2004”, World Bank, 2007, accessed at 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/Introduction.jsp 
Chilosi, Alberto, “On the Economics and Politics of Unrestricted Immigration”, Political Quarterly, n. 
4, vol. 73, 2002, pp. 431-436 
Chu, C. Y. Cyrus, Population Dynamics: A New Economic Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998 
CIA, World Factbook, 2007, available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2007/index.html 
Cipolla, Carlo, The Economic History of World Population. 6-th ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974 
[1962] 
Clark, Gregory, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton: Princeton Un. 
Press, 2007 
Collier Paul, “Poverty reduction in Africa”, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 23 October 2007a, vol. 104, n. 
43, pp. 16763–16768 
Collier Paul, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007b 
Collins, Robert O. and James M. Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge Un. 
Press, 2007 
 - 36 -
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea (ed.), Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization. 
Oxford: Oxford Un. Press, 2004 
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, “Income Distribution Changes and Their Impact in the Post-Second 
World War Period”, in Cornia (ed.), 2004, pp. 26-54. 
Cuffaro, Nadia, Population, Economic Growth and Agriculture in Less Developed Countries. London: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Dhalla, Surjit S., Imagine There’s No Country: Poverty, Inequality and Growth in the Era of Globalisation. 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2002.  
Davies, James, Susanna Sandström, Anthony Shorrocks and Edward Wolff, “The World Distribution 
of Household Wealth”, 5/12/2006a, http://www.weourselves.org/reports/wider-wdhw-report-5-
12-2006.pdf 
Davies, James, Susanna Sandström, Anthony Shorrocks and Edward Wolff, “World Distribution of 
Household Wealth”, power point presentation, London, 5/12/2006b 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/2006-2007/2006-2007-1/wider-wdhw-launch-5-12-
2006/wider-wdhw-powerpoint-presentation.pdf 
Demsetz Harold, ‘Information and Efficiency---Another Viewpoint’, Journal of Law and Economics, 12, 
(1969), pp. 1--22, reprinted in H. Demsetz, The Organization of Economic Activity, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1988, volume 2. 
Diamond, Jared, “The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race”. Discover Magazine, May 
1987, pp. 64-66 
Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs And Steel : A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years. London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1997 
Djankov, Simeon, García Montalvo, José and Reynal-Querol, Marta, “The Curse of Aid”, March 
2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=893558 
Dollar, David and Aart Kray , “Trade, Growth, and Poverty”. The Economic Journal, vol. 114 (493), 
2004, pp. F22-F49 
Easterly, William, The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and 
So Little Good. New York: Penguin Books, 2006 (Penguin paperback edition 2007). 
Easterly, William, “An Ivory Tower Analysis of Real World Poverty”, The Lancet, Vol. 370 No. 
9597 pp 1475-1476 (available from www.thelancet.com)  
Easterly, William, “Author’s response to JD Sachs review of my book”, n.d., 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/File/Easterly_response_to_Jeffrey_Sachs_the_Lan
cet.pdf 
Eloranta, Jari. "Military Spending Patterns in History". EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert 
Whaples, September 27, 2005. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/eloranta.military 
Ember, Carol R., “Myths about Hunter-Gatherers”. Ethnology, Vol. 17, n. 4. (Oct., 1978), pp. 439-448 
Federico, Giovanni, "Review of Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of 
Agrarian Change under Population Pressure." EH.Net Economic History Services, Apr 16 2001.URL: 
http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/federico 
Federico, Giovanni, “The World Economy 0–2000 AD: A Review Article”. European Review of 
Economic History, 6 (2002),  pp. 111–120 
Federico, Giovanni, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800-2000. Princeton: 
Princeton Un. Press, 2005 
Friedman, David, “Laissez-Faire in Population: the Least Bad Solution”. An Occasional Paper of the 
Population Council., 1972. Available at http://daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Laissez-
Faire_In_Popn/L_F_in_Population.html 
Giddens, Anthony, and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of 
Modernity. Stanford: Stanford Un. Press, 1998 
 - 37 -
Haub, Carl, "How Many People Have Ever Lived on Earth?" Population Today, February, 1995. 
Hellie, Richard, “Slavery”; Encyclopaedia Britannica’s Guide to Black History, 2007, accessed at 
http://www.britannica.com/blackhistory/article-9109538 
Hujo, Katja and Nicola Piper, “South–South Migration: Challenges for Development and Social 
Policy”. Development, 2007, 50(4), pp. 19–25 
Huxley, Julian, Essays of a Humanist. London: Chatto & Windus, 1964 
IMF, World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inequality. IMF, October 2007a 
IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, October 2007b 
Kenny, Charles, “Were People in the Past Poor and Miserable?”. KYKLOS, Vol. 59, 2006, n. 2, pp. 
275–306 
Knack, Stephen, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: A Cross-Country Empirical 
Analysis”,November 1999. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2396, November 
1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=630769 (revised 2005). 
Kremer, Michael, “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. To 1990”. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1993, pp. 681-716 
Maddison, Angus, The World Economy. Paris: OECD, 2006 
Marx, Karl, “Critique of the Gotha Programme”. Translation of the original German text in 1875. 
Available at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ 
McEvedy, Colin and Richard Jones, Atlas of World Population History. New York: Penguin, 1978 
Milanovic, Branko, “Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on Income Distribution? Evidence 
from Household Budget Surveys”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2876, August 2002 
Milanovic, Branko, “The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It”. World 
Development Vol. 31, 2003, n. 4, pp. 667–683 
Milanovic, Branko, "An Estimate of Average Income and Inequality in Byzantium Around Year 
1000", December 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=647764  
Milanovic, Branko, “The Modern World:  The effect of democracy, colonialism and war on 
economic growth 1820-2000”, August 2005, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=812144  
Milanovic, Branko, “Global Income Inequality: What It Is And Why It Matters?”, DESA Working 
Paper n. 26, August 2006, at http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp26_2006.pdf 
Milanovic, Branko, “Rules of Redistribution and Foreign Aid: A Proposal for a Change in the Rules 
governing Eligibility for Foreign Aid”. October 2007, at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/Rules.pdf 
Milanovic, Branko, “Ethical case and economic feasibility of global transfers”. November 2007, at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/Ethical.pdf 
Milanovic, Branko, "An Even Higher Global Inequality than Previously Thought: A Note on Global 
Inequality Calculations Using the 2005 ICP Results" (December 28, 2007). World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper Series Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081970  
Milanovic, Branko, “Where In The World Are You? Assessing The Importance Of Circumstance 
And Effort In A World of Different Mean Country Incomes and (Almost) no Migration”. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4493, January 2008 
Milanovic, Branko, Peter H. Lindert, Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Measuring Ancient Inequality”. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4412, November 2007. 
Nel, Philip, “The Return of Inequality”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp 689 – 706, 
2006, available at: http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2006-44.pdf 
Norberg, Johan, In Defense of Global Capitalism. Washington: Cato Institute, 2003. 
Peng Xizhe, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," 
Population and Development Review 13, n. 4 (1987), 639-70 
 - 38 -
Petri,.Elio, The 10th Victim (original Italian title: La Decima Vittima), 1965 movie (based on Robert 
Sheckley’s 1953 short story “The Seventh Victim”) 
PRB (Population Reference Bureau), World Population Data Sheet 2007; at 
http://www.prb.org/pdf07/07WPDS_Eng.pdf 
Ravallion, Martin, Shaohua Chen and Prem Sangraula, “New Evidence on the Urbanization of 
Global Poverty”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4199, April 2007 
Sachs, Jeffrey, Review of Easterly (2006). Lancet, vol 367 April 22, 2006, pp. 1309-1310 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., Making Globalization Work. London: Penguin Books, 2007 [2006] 
United Nations, “Annex II - Methods of Aggregation” Handbook of the International Comparison 
Programme. New York: ONU, 1992, accessed at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/icp/ipc7_htm.htm 
United Nations, “The World at Six Billion”, 1999, at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbillion.htm. 
United Nations, “World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population Database”,  2006, 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), Human Development Report  2007-2008. New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2007. Downloadable at http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
US Census Bureau, “Historical Estimates of World Population”, 13 July 2007a, at 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldhis.html 
US Census Bureau, “World Population Information”, 18 July 2007b, at 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html 
WHO (World Health Organization), World Health Statistics, 2007. downloaded at 
http://www.who.int/entity/whosis/whostat2007.pdf 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies: A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001 
World Bank,World Development Indicators, 2005 
World Bank, Global Monitoring Report, 2007 
Yao, Shujie, “A Note on the Causal Factors of China’s Famine in 1959–1961”, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 107, n. 6, Part 1. (Dec., 1999), pp. 1365-1369 
Zolo, Danilo, Globalisation : An Overview. Colchester : ECPR press, 2007 
 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX: LIFE STATISTICS 
Table 1A136 Yearly births per 100 population 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99137 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
 
Table 2A. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999138 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
 
                                                 
136 Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the source); 
for the year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). The data reported in the World 
Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable that among the 223 countries 
whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African countries.  
137 Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 
(Macedonia). 
138 Source: Maddison, p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan, Group B is the rest of the world. 
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Table 3A.139 Life expectancy at birth 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed 
countries 
   76.7 
Less developed 
countries 
   64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                 
139 In order to understand the implication of the data one should consider that the data concerning life 
expectancy are affected for pre-modern and modern backward societies by very high child mortality 
rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic regime such as in 
the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live birth per woman) 
of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another one, corresponding 
more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility rate 4 life expectancy was 
33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). 
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 Table 4A. Some life statistics from WHO, year 2005140 
 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate141 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate142 
Infant 
mortality 
rate143 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate144 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate145 
 male female male female male female     
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East 
Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 
48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union146 
76 82      5   
Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland147)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
 
                                                 
140 WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in their assessment, see 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
141 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
142 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
143 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
144  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
145 Per 100,000 live births. 
146 From CIA (2007). 
147 In the case of Swaziland the very high mortality rate and the the very low life expectancy can be related 
to a HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of nearly 40% (cf. CIA Factbook , 2007).. 
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Table 5A. Some life statistics of Eastern Europe from WHO, year 2005148 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate149 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate150 
Infant 
mortality 
rate151 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate152 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate153 
 male female male female male female     
Albania 69 73 59 63 167 98 18 16 9 55 
Belarus 63 75 57 65 366 133 9 7 3 36 
Bosnia 70 77 62 66 186 88 15 13 10 31 
Bulgaria 69 76 63 67 213 92 15 12 7 32 
Croatia 72 79 64 69 166 65 7 6 5 10 
Czech Rep 73 79 66 71 156 70 4 3 2 9 
Estonia 67 78 59 69 281 100 7 6 4 38 
Hungary 69 77 62 68 256 107 8 6 5 11 
Latvia 65 76 58 68 314 114 10 8 6 61 
Lithuania 65 77 59 68 326 109 9 7 5 19 
Poland154 71 79 63 68 208 79 8 6 5 10 
Romania 68 76 61 65 230 102 19 16 10 58 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
Serbia 70 75 … … 192 98 9 8 … … 
Slovakia 70 78 63 69 201 77 9 7 4 10 
Slovenia 74 81 67 72 152 67 4 3 2 17 
Ukraine 61 73 55 64 403 150 17 13 7 38 
 
                                                 
148 World Health Statistics, WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, 2001. 
149 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
150 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
151 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
152  Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
153 Per 100,000 live births. 
154 From CIA (2007). 
